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450 abstract
This paper provides a review of empirical research on the factors determining the 
budget/fiscal transparency of subnational governments. It focuses on academic 
online databases by conducting keyword searches that take in papers published in 
the period 2000-2017. Three important observations can be made: (1) there is a 
lack of a unique definition of budget/fiscal transparency; (2) the different defini-
tions lead to disharmonised budget/fiscal transparency measurements; (3) there is 
a heterogeneity of the definition and measurement of some explanatory variables 
that can lead to apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the results 
obtained. However, the paper provides a balanced account of core explanatory 
factors, emphasizing variables that, despite heterogeneity in definition and meas-
urement, have a significant impact on the levels of subnational government budget/
fiscal transparency. Since the review involves mainly online disclosure, future 
studies might want to extend the observation period, or implement systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses to gain additional insights on this topic.
Keywords: subnational governments, budget transparency, empirical review, main 
determinants
1 IntroductIon
It can be said that in the past two decades, and especially in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, enormous pressure has been put on governments to improve their 
communication with citizens by being more open, transparent and accountable. In 
this sense, more and more attention is being paid to fiscal and budgetary issues. 
Some of the most prominent initiatives that advocate for these issues are the Inter-
national Budget Partnership (IBP), the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency 
(GIFT) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Due to the OGP’s strong 
advocacy, a total of 75 countries have endorsed the Open Government Declaration 
and announced their country action plans. More recently, OGP was opened to 
subnational governments. In 2016, a total of 15 subnational governments signed 
the declaration and submitted their action plans to be implemented throughout 
2017, as part of a pilot program. 
Thus, the discourse of budget transparency seems to be changing, giving ever more 
importance to subnational governments (SNGs). Accordingly, subnational budgets 
are becoming a ubiquitous topic in the field of public financial management. Their 
importance also stems from the fact that public goods and services are particularly 
tangible at the subnational and especially the local level. Therefore, citizens may 
have more interest in participating in local budget processes, where they can see 
their direct impact on local development. Furthermore, subnational budget transpar-
ency enables ordinary citizens and civil society organizations to evaluate govern-
ment services and facilities and suggest possible changes and needs in the future. 
The internet has provided an additional incentive for proactive publishing, ena-
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451ernment consultation processes. It can be said that the rise of the internet has fur-
thered budget transparency by allowing rapid and inexpensive proactive disclo-
sure (Darbishire, 2010). Consequently, SNGs have increasingly resorted to proac-
tive budget disclosure, thus not only reducing demand-side pressures, but also 
changing their attitude and way of communicating with citizens. Despite the 
widespread availability and bidirectionality of the internet, SNG websites vary 
greatly in the amount of information available, comprehensiveness, timeliness 
and interactiveness (Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández, 2008). 
While some SNGs run open budget policies, others oppose the practice and rarely 
use the low cost benefits of online proactive publishing. 
The aim of this study is, hence, to review the development of research conducted 
previously in order to understand the factors that could influence SNG budget/
fiscal disclosure. In other words, it aims to produce a balanced account of the set 
of variables that significantly affect SNG budget/fiscal transparency. Some previ-
ous studies reviewed the various types of public sector disclosure (Bakar and 
Saleh, 2015). However, this study explores studies published in the 2000-2017 
period, focusing explicitly on budget or fiscal transparency. The paper is organ-
ized as follows. Section 2 provides the methodological framework. Section 3 pre-
sents different definitions and measurements of budget/fiscal transparency. Sec-
tion 4 offers a balanced account of core determinants of SNG budget/fiscal disclo-
sure. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for future research.
2 frameworK for analysIs
This review focuses on identifying explicitly quantitative studies on the determi-
nants of SNG budget/fiscal transparency. The decision for quantitative studies is 
because they allow for rapid analysis and replication, which increases reliability, 
validity and the greater probability of obtaining unambiguous results, which con-
tributes to better decision-making. Subnational governments include all levels 
below the national government, i.e. local, regional, state and provincial. To identify 
eligible articles, this study used the Summon discovery service – a unified search 
for all electronic sources of academic publications, including search interfaces 
such as ProQuest, EBSCO Host, Web of Science and Scopus. In addition, Google 
Scholar and hand searches were also used. This review includes studies published 
from 2000-2017, thus the focus is inherently on online disclosure. Only studies in 
English are taken into consideration. Search terms used were “causes of budget/
fiscal transparency”, “subnational government transparency”, “budget/fiscal trans-
parency determinants”, “local government transparency” or just “government 
transparency”. Since only a few studies focused solely on budget or fiscal transpar-
ency, it should be noted that this review includes all studies that, in their transpar-
ency measure, have at least one dimension concerning the budget, i.e. revenues and 
expenditures. Although books were initially included in the search, no relevant 
sources were generated on the determinants of subnational budget/fiscal transpar-
ency. This is probably due to it being an insufficiently researched topic, which is 
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452 However, the eligibility criteria were designed to ensure that high-quality relevant 
work is included, specifically referring to empirical quantitative studies that employ 
budget/fiscal transparency as the dependent variable. Finally, 20 studies are 
included in the review. All studies are peer-reviewed and published in journals, 
with the exception of Ma and Wuʼs (2011) paper which remained as part of the 1st 
Global Conference on Transparency Research held at Rutgers University.
Although it is unquestionable that every paper has made a contribution, this 
review highlights four papers on account of their narrow focus on budget/fiscal 
transparency, strong and credible evidence, and rigorous methodology used. The 
first is a paper by Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), who used a unique panel data on 
the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the U.S. states over the past 
three decades. They used both case studies and quantitative analysis, presenting 
robust results. Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás and Portillo-Tarragona (2009) used 
multivariate logistic regression, focusing exclusively on the availability of budget-
related documents. Although their results showed different levels of robustness, 
they proved that size of the municipality, political will, and residents’ income all 
affect budget disclosure. Similarly, Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2011) exam-
ined the determinants of budget and financial transparency using both OLS and 
2SLS regression analysis. After controlling for endogeneity, they confirmed the 
robustness of the model employed. Like them, Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero 
(2012) remained focused on budget information disclosures. They applied their 
analysis to a large sample of municipalities, using a logit regression analysis for 
panel data, covering a seven-year period. These four papers are emphasized on the 
basis of measurements of the dependent variables, and the credibility and quality 
of the evidence and method used for determining the factors of budget/fiscal trans-
parency. With this in mind, all the papers included in the review are presented in 
the following chapters, first by measuring the dependent variables and then by the 
established budget/fiscal transparency factors.
3  budget/fIscal transParency – from defInItIon to 
measurement
3.1 defInItIon
In the literature, budget transparency and fiscal transparency are often used inter-
changeably, which may point to the equivalence of these two concepts. However, 
budget transparency is a narrower concept, focusing on the budget reports within 
the budget cycle. On the other hand, fiscal transparency also includes fiscal activ-
ities undertaken outside the budget sector, aiming at reducing off-budget transac-
tions (IMF, 1997). It often includes information on all stocks as well as flows, 
which can hardly be found in the budget documents. Still, it is difficult to make a 
strict division between these two concepts, since they are intertwined and some-
times even used synonymously. Therefore, this paper will use both terms. One of 
the most comprehensive definitions of fiscal transparency was offered by Kopits 
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453“Fiscal transparency implies an openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector 
accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehen-
sive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information 
on government activities – whether undertaken inside or outside the gov-
ernment sector – so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately 
assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of 
government activities, including their present and future economic and 
social implications”.
In accordance with this definition, Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2002) stressed that 
financial documents should be informative and comprehensive, but at the same 
time easily understandable, leaving the option of independent scrutiny. In order to 
facilitate this inspection and monitoring of economic policies by national authori-
ties, financial markets and international institutions, the IMF has developed a 
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (IMF, 1998). The Code consisted 
of four main principles: 
 1) clarity of roles and responsibilities; 
 2) public availability of information; 
 3) open budget preparation, execution, and reporting; and 
 4) independent assurances of integrity. 
Although this Code has helped practitioners in understanding basic concepts of 
fiscal transparency practices, it did not contain clear guidelines or standards that 
would facilitate the way and approach to measuring fiscal transparency. However, 
the Code was revised in 2007, pointing out that fiscal data (budget forecasts and 
updates, annual budget and final accounts, fiscal reports) should meet accepted data 
quality standards. Similarly, the OECD has developed best practices for budget 
transparency, although their definition of budget transparency refers to broader 
concept of fiscal matters: “full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a 
timely and systematic manner” (OECD, 2002:7). The best practices are divided 
into three parts – budget reports, specific disclosures, and integrity assurance 
(table 1). It is evident that only the first section corresponds to pure budget disclo-
sure, while the other two represent wider fiscal matters. Still, the first section can 
be considered the first internationally recognized standard for budget reporting. 
Table 1 
The “three pillars” of the OECD’s best budget transparency practices
budget reports Specific disclosures Integrity, control and accountability
The budget Economic assumptions Accounting policies
Pre-budget report Tax expenditures Systems and responsibility
Monthly reports Financial assets and liabilities Audit
Mid-year report Non-financial assets Public and parliamentary scrutiny
Year-end report Employee pension obligations
Pre-election report Contingent liabilities
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454 It could be said that a number of authors have defined budget/fiscal transparency 
not only as the availability of budget/fiscal information, but also in terms of open-
ness and public accountability. This can best be seen in Kopits and Craig (1998) 
who argue that fiscal transparency does not only imply access to fiscal reports but, 
rather, the openness of fiscal policies and procedures. Similarly, Andreula, Chong 
and Guillén (2009) state that fiscal transparency, apart from open budget prepara-
tion and availability of fiscal information, also implies assurances of roles and 
responsibilities. In this sense, the IMF has indicated the difference between fiscal 
reporting and fiscal transparency. While the first refers to the production and avail-
ability of fiscal information, the second relates to the “clarity, reliability, fre-
quency, timeliness and relevance of public fiscal reporting and the transparency of 
the government’s fiscal policy-making process” (IMF, 2012:5).
One can conclude that there is no uniform definition of budget/fiscal transparency, 
which indicates a complex understanding of this topic. In other words, while there 
are certain standards and guidelines, different definitions and interpretations 
directly affect the approach and the way of measurement. Certainly, the methods 
and scope of measurement also depend on the context in which the research is 
carried out. Since this review is based on the causes rather than the effects of 
budget/fiscal transparency, the next section provides an empirical overview of dif-
ferent measurements in which the budget/fiscal transparency measure appears as 
a dependent variable.
3.2  VarIous aPProaches to measurIng subnatIonal budget/fIscal 
transParency 
“Conceptually, a statistical measure of transparency is the precision of the 
information that is obtained, i.e. a function of its relevance and quality”
(Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999:4).
Given the specificities of different countries’ laws, standards, procedures and con-
texts, one should be careful while summing, comparing and interpreting different 
definitions and measures of budget/fiscal transparency. In other words, subna-
tional comparisons may be most important within, rather than across countries. 
Accordingly, this section seeks to present the first studies from Spain and USA – 
since most papers on this topic are focused on the SNGs of these two countries. 
Then, individual studies with samples from other countries were presented.
spain
The largest body of research comes from Spanish local governments. Gandía and 
Archidona (2008) presented an extensive local government online disclosure 
index, which consists of five sub-indices, two of which provide comprehensive 
budget and financial information. The other three dimensions include general 
government information, web presentation and navigation, and relational web to 
address interactivity and functionality of the web. Unlike them, Serrano-Cinca, 
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455financial disclosure which they measured by sending questionnaires to munici-
palities regarding their online publication of nine items (based on Spanish legis-
lation regarding local government financial disclosure), including consolidated 
and unconsolidated budgets, budget and annual accounts of dependent entities. 
Like Gandía and Archidona (2008), Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López 
Hernández (2008) have also offered an extensive web financial disclosure index, 
hoping to contribute to a more harmonized framework for the structure of budget 
and financial information in Spanish local governments. Although the numbers 
of items observed are different, the main sections of their disclosure indexes are 
quite the same, including budget and financial information and web navigability. 
The main difference is that Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández 
(2008) included non-financial information, such as indicators of economy, effi-
ciency and effectiveness and paid more attention to the characteristics of infor-
mation such as timeliness, understandability or comparability rather than content 
of information provided. Several authors used the government transparency 
measure calculated by Transparency International (TI) Spain (Guillamón, Bastida 
and Benito, 2011; del Sol, 2013; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016). This 
index consists of five government transparency areas: (a) information about the 
municipal corporation; (b) social transparency; (c) financial transparency; (d) ser-
vices contracting transparency; (e) urban development and procurement trans-
parency. Among these studies, Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2011) have con-
tributed most to the field of budget/fiscal transparency, by focusing explicitly on 
TI’s financial transparency section. In other words, their dependent variable was 
based solely on financial transparency indicators, including accounting and 
budget, transparency on revenues and expenditures, and information on munici-
pal debt. Their study inspired others to use the same transparency measure for 
Spanish municipalities (del Sol, 2013; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016).
A significant study was presented by Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero (2012) who 
employed a panel analysis by using a large sample of Catalan municipalities in the 
period 2001-7. They constructed their fiscal transparency index by addressing the 
timeliness of the mandatory disclosure of municipalities that need to submit their 
budget information to the Public Audit Office for Catalonia. The budget informa-
tion consisted of the following: budget approval, final budget, budget balances, 
closed settlement budgets, treasury statement, treasury surplus, net wealth state-
ment, income statement and indebtedness. Similarly, Caamaño-Alegre et al. (2013) 
have investigated Galician municipalities. They based their budget transparency 
measure on the IMF’s revised Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and 
sent the questionnaires to government officials by using a Likert-type survey on 
open budget process, public availability of information and assurance of integrity. 
However, unlike Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero (2012) who offered a large number 
of observations and time variation, this study remained limited in this sense. 
A slightly different approach to measuring government transparency was provided 
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456 Spanish city councils. In this way, they wanted to examine the existence of partici-
pative and social web with the possibility of user-generated content. Accordingly, 
their disclosure index contained not only information disclosure, but also relational 
web. Similar to del Sol (2013), they observed the total index, as well as three sub-
indices – ornamental index (general and citizen information), relational index, and 
information index, which includes budgetary and financial disclosure. 
united states
Shortly after the OECD and the IMF implemented Codes of Best Practice for Fis-
cal Transparency, Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) published one of the most promi-
nent and influential studies on the causes of fiscal transparency. They examined 
the determinants of U.S. States both conceptually and empirically. A conceptual 
section included case studies of the states that managed to make significant pro-
gress towards higher transparency levels within a short time frame. On the other 
side, the transparency measure was not based on the availability of fiscal docu-
ments, but rather on transparency of state government budget procedures. Using 
the 1990s cross-sectional data from the National Association of State Budget 
Officers and the National Conference of State Legislatures, they extended the data 
to the beginnings of transparent budget procedures of US states, covering the 
period 1972-2002. This enabled them to use panel analysis which, to the best of 
my knowledge, was used for the first time in analyzing the causes of subnational 
fiscal transparency. Although this study offers a unique data set, comprising sur-
vey responses to a questionnaire sent to the budget officers of all fifty states, 
because of the period covered, it could not address e-government practices. 
However, with the rapid adoption of the internet, more recent studies are mainly 
focused on online fiscal/budget transparency, usually examining transparency lev-
els on governments’ official websites. While Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) offered 
a transparency measure with a considerable time variation, more recent studies 
looked at the budget/fiscal transparency at one point in time or with small time 
periods. Bernick et al. (2014) dropped to a lower level, exploring the fiscal trans-
parency practices of U.S. counties in 2014. They measured the online availability 
of a comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) and availability and compre-
hensiveness of budget information (no exact document or information is indi-
cated). Similarly, Lowatcharin and Menifield (2015) investigated county website 
transparency in 2010. However, their county transparency measure (conducted by 
the Sunshine Review) included not only fiscal disclosure but a wider spectrum of 
government transparency such as permits and zoning, contracts, lobbying, etc. 
Relying on Groff and Pitman's (2004) description of internet financial reporting 
for the 100 largest U.S. municipalities, Styles and Tennyson (2007) extended the 
findings by examining the online availability and accessibility of CAFR data for a 
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457other countries
When it comes to pioneers in dealing with voluntary internet financial reporting in 
subnational governments, the paper by Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere (2005) 
deserves highlighting. They observed New Zealand’s district, city, and regional 
councils, by constructing the financial transparency measure as a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not the local authority publishes financial informa-
tion on the web. However, their definition of what is considered published may be 
somewhat confusing, since they had four disclosure categories: financial high-
lights only, annual reports only, annual plan only, and combinations of annual 
reports, plans and financial highlights together. In other words, it is not clear 
whether there is any council that has published, for example, both annual plan and 
report, in which case the analysis could change considerably. García-Tabuyo, 
Sáez-Martín and Caba-Pérez (2016) investigated online proactive disclosure of 
the 40 largest municipalities in each of the five countries of Central America – El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala and Honduras. This was a valuable 
study, since the same transparency measure was employed for local government 
transparency in different country contexts. However, their measure consists of 
five transparency areas, where economic and financial transparency (including 
enacted and executed consolidated and individual budget and budget amend-
ments) accounts for 20% the total index. 
On the other hand, some studies focused explicitly on fiscal transparency, either on 
a sample of Brazilian states (Zuccolotto and Teixeira, 2014) or Chinese provincial 
government (Ma and Wu, 2011). While Ma and Wu (2011) used the data collected 
from the first two years of the four-year survey by the Public Policy Research 
Center in Shanghai, Zuccolotto and Teixeira (2014) employed a fiscal transparency 
measure developed by Biderman and Pottomatti (2010)1. Tavares and da Cruz 
(2017) used TI Portugalʼs index of municipal transparency to assess a disclosure of 
Portuguese municipalities. The index is a comprehensive measure of local gov-
ernemnt transparency, comprising seven dimensions one of which is economic and 
financial transparency. However, unlike other extensive measures, it only monitors 
the availability of a set of information items on a municipality's website, not taking 
into account accessibility, navigability, reliability or the quality of the information. 
A study presented by Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi (2017) analyzed website 
disclosure of Italian and Spanish municipalities. Although their contribution is 
valuable (very few studies with an international context), they did not sufficiently 
address budget/fiscal transparency, except for financial statements and information 
about municipalities’ assets, such as values, location and revenue.
3.3  the challenge of subnatIonal budget/fIscal transParency 
measurement
This review will outline several budget/fiscal transparency measurement chal-
lenges and opportunities. First, the use of the same transparency measure within a 
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458 country would allow for a comparison of the results of different studies, which 
could contribute to a greater understanding of inconsistent results and to the 
reduction or explanation of the ambiguity in the previous findings. The review 
shows that only a few studies used the same transparency index within a country, 
as with the TI Spain index used by De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero (2016), del Sol 
(2013), and Guillamón, Bastida and Benito (2011). Second, the transparency 
measure mainly involved one year of observation, and only a few studies have had 
a long dataset of the dependent variable, such as Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) or 
Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero (2012). The longer time span of the dependent var-
iable opens the door to many methodological approaches, enables a better quality 
analysis, and gives an opportunity to observe the progress of SNG budget/fiscal 
transparency. Third, in order to improve the observation of the causes of budget/
fiscal transparency, it is necessary to have more studies focusing solely on budget-
ary and fiscal indicators.
Although strong efforts have been made to standardize fiscal transparency meas-
ures at the national level, this remains an empirical and contextual challenge at the 
local level. However, some studies have already examined cross-country analyses 
by introducing their own index on a sample of municipalities (García-Tabuyo, 
Sáez-Martín and Caba-Pérez, 2016; Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi, 2017). 
Nonetheless, to facilitate these efforts, analogously to the IBP Open Budget Sur-
vey, one of the biggest challenges (given the diversity of the local self-government 
system) is to create a harmonized budget/fiscal transparency index capable of 
being applied to the subnational governments of various countries. Results of 
these studies could provide more comprehensive insights into the contextual sen-
sitivity, but also generally in examining the causes of budget/fiscal transparency.
4  determInants of subnatIonal budget/fIscal transParency 
– emPIrIcal oVerVIew
4.1 heterogeneIty of defInItIon and measurement of VarIables
This review discusses the different definitions and measurements of some varia-
bles. While different measurements are not unexpected in different countries (bear-
ing in mind different types of data), the main issue is when these arise within a 
single country, which can lead to confusion and “false” variability in the results. 
However, when concluding and interpreting results of previous studies, attention 
has to be paid to the definitions and the way of measuring variables, regardless of 
whether they are in-country or cross-country comparisons. According to the litera-
ture, some of the most frequently used variables that can cause confusion are lever-
age, debt, and political competition. Although the definition of leverage is quite 
unambiguous, several studies have used different measures. Laswad, Fisher and 
Oyelere (2005) have measured it in two ways, as a ratio of long-term liabilities in 
total assets, and in total public equity. On the other hand, some studies have used 
financial expenses per capita as a proxy for leverage (Gandía and Archidona, 2008; 
Gandía, Marrahí and Huguet, 2016). Gandía and Archidona (2008) have equated 
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459used the cost of debt as a proxy of indebtedness, which is measured as municipal 
financial expenses per capita. At the same time, Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar 
and López Hernández (2008) used funding costs of current year budget expendi-
ture per capita as a proxy for the cost of debt, not assigning it to leverage, but rather 
to debt. Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi (2017) have not even described their 
leverage measure. They defined it simply as a value of leverage per capita, while 
the measure was described just as natural logarithm, thus leaving it unexplained. 
A unique measure for debt issuance was presented by Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás 
and Portillo-Tarragona (2009), who used a dichotomic variable which assigns the 
value of 1 if the town hall has municipal bonds in circulation, denoting a debt issu-
ance. On the other side, some debt measures are more straight-forward, such as 
debt level as a percentage of the total budget (del Sol, 2013) or the often-used 
municipal public debt per capita (Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006; Styles and Tenny-
son, 2007; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011; Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013).
While some authors argue that a government’s decision to disclose or retain infor-
mation is inherently political (Wehner and de Renzio, 2013), others claim that 
political competition is a major driver of transparency reforms (Berliner and Erlich, 
2015). However, the mode of measurement of political competition imposes the 
greatest variability among political determinants. There are various measures intro-
duced for this variable. Some studies observe it as a margin of victory, measured by 
the difference between the percentage of votes obtained by the parties coming in 
first and second place (De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016, 2017; Tavares and da 
Cruz, 2017). Others see it as a measure of dispersion, i.e. the standard deviation of 
the percentage of votes received by each political party (Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez 
Bolívar and López Hernández, 2008; Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero, 2012). 
Caamaño-Alegre et al. (2013) applied the measure developed by Laakso and Taa-
gepera (1979) – an effective number of political parties, whose calculation also 
contains each party's proportion of all votes. Several studies focused explicitly on 
competition in the municipal council. Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere (2005), and 
Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás and Portillo-Tarragona (2009) measured almost the 
same thing. While the first used the ratio of candidates to council positions availa-
ble, the latter defined it as the ratio of candidates to councillors elected. However, 
despite the different definitions, it could be said that their measure is the same, 
since it seldom happens that available council positions are not filled. 
By using different measures for one variable, results may vary within one study, 
let alone comparing different studies, contexts or subnational international com-
parisons. In this sense, one should be careful while summing and interpreting 
results because the measure always speaks more than the variable name.
4.2 maIn determInants
In order to provide the centrality of each variable in the literature, table 2 presents 
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460 are included in the review used a particular independent variable. The complete 
classification and measurements of variables can be seen in the appendix.
Table 2 















citizens and the media  
Population size/density 60




Media use and visibility 25
Source: Author.
However, this overview aims to analyze the most frequently used variables that 
have shown a significant influence, with particular emphasis on those that, despite 
heterogeneity in definition and measurement, show a significant effect. In this 
way, the review strives to produce a balanced account of core variables that greatly 
affect the level of subnational fiscal/budget transparency (table 3). To produce this 
account, the rule is that only variables that were used in at least two papers and 
which show a significant result in more than 50% of cases were included. Accord-
ingly, three basic variable categories are distinguished: financial, political, and 
citizens and the media. The following section reveals these variables and focuses 
on the explanation of the results obtained, based on some underpinnings in previ-
ous studies.
4.2.1 fInancIal VarIables
Financial leverage and debt levels are the most important financial factors deter-
mining subnational budget/fiscal transparency. Leverage refers to the use of bor-
rowed funds to finance public activities. In this sense, it can represent the amount 
of debt of the government, showing the close relation of these two terms. Accord-
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461ing resources available for other activities that are more efficient in increasing 
government’s welfare than the payment of high interest rates. Accordingly, politi-
cians are encouraged to publish government information, which in turn facilitates 
monitoring by creditors. This can be achieved easily and at low-cost by online 
proactive reporting, which is confirmed in several studies, even if they have dif-
ferent leverage measurements (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005; Gandía, Mar-
rahí and Huguet, 2016; Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi, 2017). 
Table 3 
Main determinants of subnational budget/fiscal transparency
category Variable different measurements
Financial 
Leverage
Ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets
Ratio of long-term liabilities to total public equity 
Total executed expenses per capita
Debt
Percentage of debt in total budget
Public debt per capita





Divided government; gubernatorial competition; 
legislative competition
1 if city council is governed by one of the majority 
political parties in the country
Measure of dispersion, i.e. the standard deviation of the 
percentage of votes received by each political party 
Effective number of political parties
Margin of victory, measured by the difference between 
the percentage of votes obtained by the parties coming 




Number of incumbent’s consecutive terms (tenure)
Governance 
type
1 if district councils, 0 regional or city councils
1 if provincial capitals
Form of government (1 if council-manager, 0 







Percentage of households with home internet access
Fixed internet access connections over 200 kilobits per 
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462 Moreover, politicians are incentivized to reduce debt levels because it allows for 
lower property taxes that will increase their probability of re-election (Gore, Sachs 
and Trzcinka, 2004). In this way, incumbents are encouraged to use internet 
reporting and disclose more information as this helps lenders to regularly monitor 
governments activities (Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, 2002). In other words, the 
greater the dependence on external funding sources the greater the disclosure 
(Ingram, 1984). Severel studies have confirmed this, finding a positive relation-
ship between debt levels and budget/fiscal reporting (Styles and Tennyson, 2007; 
Caba-Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández, 2008; Caamaño-Alegre et 
al., 2013; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2017). However, Alt, Lassen and Rose 
(2006) found a negative association, concluding that higher debt reduces fiscal 
transparency. But it should be pointed out that they employed debt variable only 
as a control variable. Finally, given the different leverage and debt measures used, 




When it comes to political determinants, there are three variables that contribute 
to explaining different levels of subnational budget/fiscal transparency – political 
competition, different executive features, and type of government. Stronger polit-
ical competition encourages incumbents to bear higher monitoring costs, because 
if they do not keep pre-election promises, they are exposed to the long-term costs 
of re-election failure (Evans and Patton, 1987). Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero 
(2012) stressed the importance of political competition in times in which an 
incumbent’s re-election is uncertain. With a strong competition, agents use fiscal 
disclosure as their strategic instrument to have a greater chance of being re-
elected. However, when it comes to the degree of fiscal information they wish to 
provide, agents face a trade-off. According to Ferejohn (1986) higher levels of 
fiscal transparency allow politicians to have higher wages, since principals are 
now ready to pay more taxes. At the same time, greater information disclosure 
diverts agents from rent extraction. Accordingly, in the cases of strong competi-
tion, higher transparency becomes agents’ instrument only if a trade-off is solved 
in favour of higher salaries. In cases of low competition, transparency becomes 
less important for politicians, as they in this case have high expectations of staying 
in power (Piotrowski and Bertelli, 2010). 
It is argued that parties in power have greater benefits from divulging information 
in both a low and a high political competition environment. In the case of high 
competition, they have the incentive to show their current actions and good man-
agement (Caba Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández, 2014), while low 
competition makes them more confident of their position in power and so willing 
to reveal more information (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012). By contrast, 
other competing parties in a high competition environment abstain from the risk 
of disclosure, as this may reduce their ability to control their message (Caba Pérez, 
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463In this context, the empirical results on political competition are mixed. While sev-
eral authors proved that competition fosters subnational fiscal transparency 
(Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; Gandía and Archidona, 2008; Tavares and da Cruz, 
2017), others disputed this, showing a negative correlation (Alt, Lassen and Rose, 
2006; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Gandía, Marrahí and Huguet, 2016). 
Generally, it is hard to report the true effect of political competition, since the con-
text, data used, and different country characteristics may greatly affect this variabil-
ity in the results. However, even with wide range of measurements used, political 
competition proved to be a significant predictor of subnational fiscal transparency. 
executive features
Different incumbent characteristics and features also affect government’s decision 
on divulging or withholding fiscal information. The mayor’s gender is the first of 
those features, showing a significant influence on subnational transparency levels. 
Many studies have investigated the differences between women and men officials, 
mostly favouring women’s leadership style and its effect on decision-making in 
the public sector. It is argued that female mayors are more likely than their male 
counterparts to actively engage citizens in the decision-making, thus fostering 
participation, communication and different inputs (Fox and Schuhmann, 1999). 
Some studies are concerned with gender and ethics, suggesting that women are 
less likely to behave unethically in the workplace in order to achieve greater finan-
cial rewards (Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008). In addi-
tion, female mayors may be less likely to experience the principal-agent dilemma, 
since they are more ethically minded than men (Khazanchi, 1995). Some authors 
stress that the critical representation of women in governance structures can affect 
the way of government functioning, making it more socially responsive and trans-
parent (Rodríguez-Garcia, 2015). Several authors have empirically confirmed 
these underpinnings, finding a positive relationship between a female mayor and 
budget transparency (De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2017; Tavares and da Cruz, 
2017). However, Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi (2017) proved the opposite, 
but showing the significance in only one of the three models presented.
It is also argued that longer tenure in office reduces pressure on the officials to 
disclose information. Tavares and da Cruz (2017) found that the number of an 
incumbent’s consecutive terms in office is one of the factors most detrimental to 
transparency. This is consistent with the findings by Berliner (2014), who claimed 
that turnover in executive office fosters the adoption of freedom of information 
laws, which are associated with increased transparency. By contrast, Ma and Wu 
(2011) showed a positive correlation, stressing that governments need more time 
to achieve the support needed for the implementation of administrative reforms so 
as to foster transparency and openness. It could also be argued, however, that 
much more research is needed, as only few studies have employed this variable, 
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464 governance type
There has been a tendency for researchers to include a dummy variable that 
addresses the type or form of the government, thus pointing to the governance 
structure. This could be an important argument, especially in the context of imple-
mentation of the new public management (NPM). Namely, within this approach, 
citizens are viewed as customers and public servants as public managers, while 
transparency and accountability are perceived as fundamental elements of good 
governance (Caba Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández, 2008). Las-
wad, Fisher and Oyelere (2005) were among the first to use the variable “form of 
local authority” by distinguishing between district, city and regional councils. 
They found that regional and city councils are more transparent than district coun-
cils. However, it is not clear why they have not used a nominal variable, rather 
than a dichotomous, to address all three council types separately. It should be 
noted, though, that the governance type may vary greatly among countries, thus 
depending on the setting of the public administration of a country. In some cases, 
the central government has administration delegations across the country, which 
are assigned to the several subnational units. In Spain, for example, these are pro-
vincial capitals where the central government holds offices to provide efficiently 
and effectively some additional services to citizens. These political capitals proved 
to be less transparent than other Spanish cities (del Sol, 2013). Since this is a spe-
cific country context, it would be difficult to find theoretical underpinnings that 
support this evidence. In spite of that, the author indicated that the reason for low 
transparency could be the capitals’ privileged treatment by the central govern-
ment. Lowatcharin and Menifield (2015) on a sample of US counties found that 
council-manager governments tend to be more transparent than their mayor-coun-
cil counterparts. It could be argued, however, that council-managers are more 
prone to the adoption of web technologies and e-government solutions, rather than 
mere transparency (Moon, 2002). In other words, higher transparency in these 
governments is not a goal by itself, but comes as a result of their propensity for 
web technology implementations.
4.2.3 cItIZens and the medIa
Population
One of the variables most often used in explaining SNG fiscal transparency is the 
number of inhabitants. It is widely discussed that larger SNGs have the extra 
resources and capacities to adopt technical and managerial innovations faster 
(Smith and Taebel, 1985; Norris and Kraemer, 1996). This is explained by the 
greater pressure they face in finding different ways for a better supply of public 
services. In addition, they may have a better trained stuff, a larger budget, and an 
established IT department, which helps them to embrace e-government practices 
(Moon and Norris, 2005). These underpinnings were strongly confirmed by sev-
eral authors (del Sol, 2013; Guillamón, Bastida and Benito, 2011; Lowatcharin 
and Menifield, 2015; Serrano-Cinca, Rueda-Tomás and Portillo-Tarragona, 2009). 
However, a study presented by Esteller-Moré and Polo Otero (2012) has revealed 




























































42 (4) 449-486 (2018)
465with a wide range of population size, they split the sample into a large and small 
population. They found a negative relationship in the small sample, but a positive 
in the larger sample (for the very big municipalities), pointing to a non-linear 
relationship between the number of inhabitants and fiscal transparency. They 
stressed that unlike small municipalities, very large units have greater capacity to 
fulfil their legal obligations, which could more than compensate for their potential 
propensity to be less transparent.
Internet access
According to Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002), the rise in the use of the inter-
net has brought different views to fiscal transparency. From the userʼs perspective, 
it is recognized as a facilitator in the demand for fiscal transparency, while from 
the supplierʼs perspective it is perceived as a tool for more effective dissemination 
of information. Internet take-up has affected the behaviour of governments, which 
are now divulging additional information and services online. Thus, its rise has 
brought about an improved transparency and financial accountability, reducing 
the costs of dissemination (Pina, Torres and Royo, 2010). Several studies that 
investigated online (mainly website) transparency reported that greater and better 
internet access in the SNGs positively affects their fiscal transparency (Caba-
Pérez, Rodríguez Bolívar and López Hernández, 2008; Gandía and Archidona, 
2008; De Araújo and Tejedo-Romero, 2017). García-Tabuyo, Sáez-Martín and 
Caba-Pérez (2016) found a positive association with mandatory disclosure, but 
surprisingly, the relationship with voluntary reporting proved to be negative. 
Although the argument may be somewhat shallow, they explained this by saying 
that voluntary information disclosure could be larger in municipalities with higher 
internet penetration and political commitment because by increasing the transpar-
ency levels, politicians aim to attract the votes of inactive citizens.
unemployment
It has been argued that lower economic development and associated higher unem-
ployment rates are damaging to civic engagement, i.e. the demand for greater 
opportunities to participate in the decision-making is lessened. Some studies used 
unemployment as a proxy for SNG economic status and found that higher eco-
nomic status (lower unemployment) positively affects transparency in public 
administration (Piotrowski and van Ryzin, 2007). In accordance with these under-
pinnings, the results largely indicate that higher unemployment rates are detri-
mental to fiscal transparency (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; De Araújo and 
Tejedo-Romero, 2016; del Sol, 2013; Tavares and da Cruz, 2017).
media
Various authors have stressed the importance of public media visibility in a govern-
ment’s divulging of information (Zimmerman, 1977; Ingram, 1984; Laswad, Fisher 
and Oyelere, 2005). It is argued that greater visibility and frequency of press report-
ing on a government's activities and work contributes to resolving the principal-
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466 ities. However, it should be noted that the media, citizens and politicians often have 
different interests. In this context, public media may be more interested in publish-
ing exclusive information, such as corruption scandals. This, in turn, affects the 
government's behavior, for it will limit the disclosure of information so as to avoid 
them being “misused” in the media (Laswad, Fisher and Oyelere, 2005; García and 
García-García, 2010; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2017). Nevertheless, studies 
have found that press and public media visibility as well as frequency of social 
media usage by SNGs have a positive impact on their fiscal transparency (Laswad, 
Fisher and Oyelere, 2005; Gandía and Archidona, 2008; Gandía, Marrahí and 
Huguet, 2016; Gesuele, Metallo and Longobardi, 2017).
5 dIscussIon and conclusIon
This paper has provided a review of empirical studies on the determinants of sub-
national government’s budget/fiscal transparency in the period 2000-2017. Sev-
eral important observations should be emphasized. First, in order to determine the 
factors involved, it is necessary to have a clear definition of budget/fiscal transpar-
ency. However, there is no consensus about this. Moreover, different definitions 
are interwoven, leading to budgetary and fiscal transparency being used inter-
changeably. The lack of a clear definition conduces to an inadequate measurement 
of budget transparency, which can significantly affect the credibility of the results 
of such research. Thus, instead of having effective transparency, this lack of clar-
ity leads to opaque, fuzzy, or zombie transparency (Fox, 2007; Michener, 2015), 
where there is a lack of disaggregation or better descriptive details. Without 
parameters, as Michener (2015) stressed, the quality and comparability of trans-
parency is compromised. Secondly, different approaches to measuring budget 
transparency, especially within the same country, reduce the effective comparison 
potential and lead to ambiguity. Thirdly, heterogeneity of the definition and meas-
urement of explanatory variables can lead to apparent contradiction and inconsist-
ency of the obtained results.
In this paper three basic categories that determine subnational government budget/
fiscal transparency are established: (1) financial (leverage and debt), (2) political 
(political competition, executive features and governance type), and (3) citizens 
and the media (population, internet access, unemployment, and the media). This 
conclusion is based on the review of 20 selected papers, following the above-
mentioned methodology. Looking at the wider literature, some of the findings can 
be related to findings at the national level, where the main factors of fiscal trans-
parency are political, namely political (electoral) competition, and the level of 
governmental democracy (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2011; Wehner and 
de Renzio, 2013). Although citizens and the media, and financial factors deter-
mine SNG fiscal transparency, at the national level its effect seems negligible. 
This may be due to the reduced participation opportunities and pressures of citi-
zens on the national government, or different structures and sources of funding of 
national and SNGs. Moreover, Wehner and de Renzio (2013) have concluded that 
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467ity at the national level when the internal demand (citizens, media) is weak. How-
ever, when it comes to a wider literature on other types of public sector transpar-
ency, all findings are highly correlated (Bakar and Saleh, 2015), including all three 
established categories.
A vast majority of studies tend to focus on local governments, thus neglecting 
other types of public sector organizations such as federal and state governments, 
or quasi-government bodies. Very few studies involved different countries in an 
investigation of subnational international comparisons. In this sense, the chal-
lenge would be to create a harmonized budget transparency measure that could be 
applied to subnational governments of different countries. Further such research 
could offer a more comprehensive insight into the factors implicated in budget/
fiscal transparency, including different country characteristics and contexts. Fur-
thermore, greater consistency in selecting proxy measures for certain variables 
could contribute to a clearer interpretation of results, while the greater time span 
of budget transparency data would allow for richer methodology solutions and 
observations.
Like any other studies, this study has a few limitations. It does not take into 
account research before 2000, as the focus is rather on online disclosure. Future 
studies may extend observation time. Furthermore, no meta-analytic studies were 
included. However, this paper can serve as the basis and motivation for imple-
menting systematic reviews and meta-analyses on this topic. In spite of these 
limitations, it is believed that the study may provide rich insights for both inter-
ested researchers and practitioners.
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